Flying Blind with Peter Robison
Alright. So, we are talking about flying blind. Adam, you were asking me who gave this this book to me.
Speaker 2:Well, in part, I was asking this because, I mean, as you mentioned, your mother, but it it it is it is so, like, on the screws perfect. And and, like, every pay p Peter, you you gotta know Brian for the 20 years 20 plus years I've known him. Like, he will pull out these air these aviation disasters as as kind of parables that are are are finally honed for the situation. It's it's it's remarkable. And so, like, each page I turned and and and also, you know, some of the things we've been reading, and discussing on this, Twitter space have been, like, kind of stories of how corporations got it right or got it wrong.
Speaker 2:So it's just this perfect intersectionality. So, obviously, Brian, not surprisingly, your mom knows you very well. She does something well. And I feel like
Speaker 1:are you are you aviation disaster saving me? I mean, is this like I I feel do I do this to a peculiar or off putting degree? I mean, apparently, I do. Is this an intervention? It's what I'm I'm surprised.
Speaker 2:I don't know how to answer this. Like, do you hear other people like, when you say, like, jal123, like, does that mean anything to anybody else? Obviously, to Peter it does, but, like, to to normal people, you know that it doesn't. Right?
Speaker 1:But it's okay. But, I mean, are you trying to are you picking on jl 123 as specific example? Because that's a germane crash actually.
Speaker 2:Well, it's what I learned
Speaker 1:about the book. Yes. So that crash is actually that's actually good as good a part as any to start. I first of all, so Peter Robinson, the the author of Flying Fly. Peter, thank you so much for joining us.
Speaker 1:And, let's actually start with jl123 just because, Adam brought it up. And this is all this is the crap this crash is horrifying. So the there was a second set of rivets that were effectively missing, and there there been a tail strike earlier on this aircraft. The tail blew off mid flight. And you really badly need the tail.
Speaker 1:And this crash was awful because people knew for, I mean and, Peter, maybe you know off the top of your head. But this this Well, Brian,
Speaker 2:I'm gonna interject just for a second because, Peter, we we lost you as a speaker again.
Speaker 1:Oh, whoops.
Speaker 2:So,
Speaker 1:so are you were you wondering how long you would take us to find out that we've lost Peter's speakers? I go
Speaker 2:off on jail. No. But this
Speaker 1:this crash is terrible because this this aircraft is doing these massive oscillations, and people basically know that they're gonna crash. And this is not a crash you wanna be in. And, Peter, I thought was amazing about this horrifying crash is that that Boeing and I didn't realize this that Boeing had accepted responsibility to a surprising degree for the crash. I didn't I I never attributed this as a Boeing failure necessarily, but, maybe you could lead us off there in terms of of, did we lose Peter again? Oh, Twitter spaces.
Speaker 2:Twitter Spaces. As we for folks, as we were getting started, Peter said, wow. This was super easy to get started.
Speaker 1:Just like, oh, hold on to those warm feelings, Peter. Yeah. You're gonna need them later. I feel like I'm in the same kind of bad relationship with the dishwasher right now. And which we were talking about lunch, and I was one of my coworkers was kind of laughing at me.
Speaker 1:Like, who's the bad relationship with the dishwasher? And I'm like, well, I'm getting a specific error code. He's like, wait a minute. It's an e 24? Like, yeah.
Speaker 1:It's an e 24 and a Bosch dishwasher.
Speaker 2:It's like, well, quick.
Speaker 1:So it looks like we're in the same bad relationship. But this this dishwasher knows to give me an error code whenever I begin to believe that it can function reliably. That's when it knows to fail. And I feel like Twitter Spaces has is wired into the same. Like, it's it's whatever I begin to believe in Twitter Spaces that it fails.
Speaker 1:And now, he is where is Peter? He's not
Speaker 2:He seems to it was in an odd state where it seemed to have think thought he was waiting to speak and was not currently in the space. Who's this? Yeah.
Speaker 1:Oh, man. Oh, Twitter. Twitter. Twitter. Twitter.
Speaker 1:Please get this working robustly for people.
Speaker 2:Yes. There's
Speaker 1:So much promise.
Speaker 2:So the well, so the this but I I the and I guess I okay.
Speaker 1:There we go. There's Peter's back. And and and, Hi.
Speaker 3:I'm back. How, how how much of that did you hear? Could I could I ask?
Speaker 1:Absolutely nothing.
Speaker 3:Okay. Alright. So, yes, the the the the the JAL 123 was, an example of the integrity that Boeing had at that point in the mid eighties. This plane that their their marquee plane, the 747, had crashed into a mountainside, and the authorities in Japan were were settling in for what they assumed would be long, arduous negotiations for Boeing to accept responsibility, but but Boeing did accept responsibility within a month and and admitted that it was its own faulty repair job that had caused the the crash, which which short circuited, what what you saw with the Max, which which was this long, fight, that was painful for for all involved. So yeah.
Speaker 3:So so that that is a great place to start because it it really shows what's been what's been lost.
Speaker 1:Well and I think the other thing that's interesting about that the about kind of that period then for Boeing is when they the the the triple 7 then. Because, I I mean, I associate Boeing aircraft with the triple 7 because it was the it mean, it was done in a different kind of way. Peter, you talked a lot about the development of the triple 7 in the book, as an interesting point of contrast.
Speaker 3:Yeah. And and it it was, it was the the airplane that Boeing did next after that 747 crash. And, what was, I heard it just described as Boeing's Camelot. It it was a period when you had engineers in charge of the company. The the mantra for the program was was working together.
Speaker 3:The idea was that customers, suppliers, Boeing's engineers would all work together to develop an airplane that that worked from the first day, And it it went 18 years before it it had a fatal crash, and it and it's still considered, you know, one of the best airplanes Boeing's ever made.
Speaker 1:And I I mean, I remember at the time. And, Adam, do you remember the triple 7 being developed? I mean, that is
Speaker 2:I I remember the launch of it, to to fanfare, but I was as I said, not not as plugged in necessarily to the launch of it as you might have been.
Speaker 1:Well, because they also made a really big deal about the fact that they were working with pilots on and the the the they made a big deal about the human factors in the cockpit.
Speaker 3:And,
Speaker 1:Peter, am I remembering that correctly?
Speaker 3:That's that's true. Yeah. That that they, they they did emphasize be because they there there was, there there it was a point where Boeing had to consider should it should it, you know, should it adopt sites to controllers that as Airbus had, you know, how how much pilot involvement is is really needed. And so they, analyzed it and and kept with the the control yokes, as they'd had in the past, but also with a substantial amount of of human pilot input. So they they carefully considered the human factors every step of the way.
Speaker 3:And and the interesting thing was that on previous Boeing airplanes, the the chief test pilot had his name scrawled, his or her name, although it was all men, scrawled under the window on the side. And instead on the triple 7, just that slogan working together was was scrawled on the side.
Speaker 1:So that to me is really interesting, and it ends up being standing in stark contrast, I feel, to the max and what happened to Boing. I mean, that kind of that very team oriented approach that Boeing had, it seemed to be really selfless in a way. I mean, is that it am I is is that a fair assessment? I see that Peter's connecting and Peter's gonna get why Twitter spaces. Why are we gonna get our postmortem about Twitter spaces?
Speaker 1:I want the Tom, I I want the NTSB to investigate every,
Speaker 3:Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 4:I I don't think anyone's dying in this crash.
Speaker 2:Yeah. That's right. Fair enough.
Speaker 3:So you you mentioned the team oriented response, and I missed the end of the question.
Speaker 2:Yeah. Just, like, I mean, it
Speaker 1:it just feels like as I was reading about the MAX, and the thing that I just I mean, over and over again, you see the executive leadership in Boeing act in a, hopefully, very selfish way. And it just feels like, wow, this this company was not that long ago, so team oriented. And it turned into it became so self serving, it feels like. And how did it make that journey so quickly? It it's it's distressing, because it it it seemed to me as a reader that that self serving nature, really manifested itself in some of the problems in the max.
Speaker 3:Yeah. I mean, that that's a I mean, we could talk a long time on that question because because it I think it is partly generational. The the, leaders of Boeing
Speaker 2:What what the heck? Jeez.
Speaker 1:Where'd the come on? This is where I mean,
Speaker 2:we need Tom, what what what what what did Oh, man. This is where
Speaker 4:This this has gotta be connectivity on his side.
Speaker 1:Yeah. You think? Yeah. Yeah. I know.
Speaker 1:Is it it's time to, like, turn on the WiFi. Turn off the WiFi. Geez. Turn on and off the WiFi.
Speaker 4:Go talk
Speaker 2:to the
Speaker 4:FBI van.
Speaker 1:Go talk to the FBI van. Exactly. Is there a Boing van in your in the in your front yard by any chance? So, and Adam, you you would not, I assume, seen this book before.
Speaker 2:No. No. No. No. No.
Speaker 2:My mom did not get this for me. But, but I was delighted for the recommendation. And, you know, you're talking about the the the development of the triple 7. And to me, that that had a lot of, kind of soul of the new machine kind of feel of it. It was, you know, a a less depth in the construction of it.
Speaker 2:But that same kind of firing alls on all cylinders kind of the the product, of the of the team really come to coming to fruition. Did did that did did you get any sense of that as well?
Speaker 1:For sure. I mean, and I I mean, I feel that, like, I mean, I know you and I have both felt this about our own careers that when I look at the the stuff that I am the most proud of as an engineer are the things that I have worked with other people on. It is when we have gone, like, when a team does something that that feels beyond their individual grasp. Yes. Yes.
Speaker 1:Absolutely. The triple 7. And I just I I love the fact that the model is working together, you know. So, yeah, the triple 7 does feel like the name goes over there. Peter, we are, so you may wanna try, like connectivity feels like it might be.
Speaker 2:Tom tells us it's connectivity. Yeah.
Speaker 3:So Yeah. Let me, I'll I'll move I'll move to another spot. Yeah. I I I don't I if if there's any other tips, you have a highly tech savvy audience.
Speaker 2:I mean, Tom, that does sound like blaming the pilots, you know, the the That's right. Exactly.
Speaker 3:It's the crew.
Speaker 1:It's the right. I know. It's Tom's gonna blame the poor network maintenance there. And, but so, I mean, and and, Peter, I've got, like, a a a ton of questions. And I I in terms of, like, where to start, there are lots of places to start.
Speaker 1:I think one of the things I'm just curious from your own perspective. So talk about the triple 7. You you started cover you're gone again.
Speaker 2:Oh.
Speaker 1:No. You're oh, no. No. No. Long easier.
Speaker 2:Just a second.
Speaker 1:Because, Peter, you were a a reporter for for Bloomberg for Bloomberg covering Boingoing at about this time. Right? I mean, you said it started covering them certainly before the McDonnell Douglas, acquisition.
Speaker 3:I yeah. I had, and can you hear me? I I should ask. Okay. Yep.
Speaker 3:We can hear you. Yes. I had, I had I had covered it started covering aerospace, in the mid nineties when I, worked for Bloomberg in Europe. And and, so I started covering aerospace then, and then I I moved to Seattle in 98. And that so that was a year after the McDonnell Douglas merger.
Speaker 3:And so I was, really hearing and seeing the the effects of that and the the infighting that that resulted.
Speaker 1:Okay. So tell me about that because I I guess I mean, I'd be I'm curious about your relationship with the story and when you clearly, you had a very early seat in terms of the the the challenges with the merger and the shifting culture at Boeing. Wow. You need to. So you may wanna you may wanna try if if wifi is turned on on your device, turn it off.
Speaker 2:Yeah. I'm actually Turn it
Speaker 1:off. Turn it on.
Speaker 3:I'll I'll try to turn it on. I'm I'm on the wireless. So, yeah, let me let me try, let me try that.
Speaker 1:Yeah. And I I I I cannot tell you how much it's how embarrassing it is the domain that I have to just basically tell you to try something else. I mean, can we we can't we can't get our act together. Like, we literally we can't even get our act together enough to discuss plane crashes, let alone aspire the middle of the safety critical system.
Speaker 3:Well, you haven't told me to turn it off and on yet. So that's I
Speaker 1:I I feel that that's that's our order or just reboot it. Right.
Speaker 2:I I yeah. I oh, it's
Speaker 1:very frustrating. Anyway, so I mean, because you've got kind of a front row seat watching the Boing culture shift, and I'm sure you were talking to people who were concerned that because at that point, McDonnell Douglas, certainly with the all the challenges the DC ten had a reputation for being more financially oriented than engineering oriented.
Speaker 3:Yeah. And and, you you know, the the thing that I experienced as a young reporter, was in 2000, which was the engineers strike at Boeing. And and that was an unusual thing because, the it wasn't particularly over wages and and benefits. It was more over the direction of the company be because these engineers, who'd who'd been through that experience of developing the triple seven and feeling that the the company was it wasn't interested in developing products. So they they suddenly were they were seeing the wind shift, and they were seeing managers from McDonnell Douglas come in who had more of a short term mentality.
Speaker 3:And, and and at the time, it was the largest white collar strike, in in American history. And, I'm gonna ask it. Can you hear me? Yes. I can hear you.
Speaker 3:Great. I I get it. I've gone through this a few times, so I I get nervous when it's quiet. But,
Speaker 1:yeah, I know.
Speaker 3:So Sorry. Anyway, so, so so yeah. And and but at that time, you also had the ascendance of of, General Electric, and that was, you know and Jack Welch was really the model at the time.
Speaker 1:And we are losing him. Okay. So the Jack Welch thing is so on so I was and and with with the 7 when the 737 max with these 2 crashes, the, and I remember speaking about this actually in 2019. And my concern was that when we fully understood this, it was gonna be revealed that Boeing had succumbed to a kind of Facebook like move fast, break things kind of mentality. A kind of a Silicon Valley, they have the consequences mentality.
Speaker 1:And that's not really correct. It's really not the the the Facebook pathology. It's the Jack Welch pathology that actually Jack Welch is actually, that kind of zeitgeist that and the the the finance oriented thinking was really much more to blame.
Speaker 2:Yeah. It it would definitely not the short term risk taking. You're right. It was the it was the myopic, cost cutting.
Speaker 1:So, Peter, did you try rebooting it, Peter?
Speaker 3:That's that's next. But you you were I I think I just caught the end of that. You you were talking about the the short term thinking and and and Jack Welch?
Speaker 1:Well, in just in terms of what you're beginning to see at the with the strike at Boeing and beginning to see this kind of this very, the cost cutting mentality, finance oriented I mean, it's like in the in the company, you've got several key stakeholders. Mhmm. You've got shareholders and investors. You've got employees, and you've got customers. And and then you got kind of society writ large.
Speaker 1:And to me, you know, the ordering when you obviously don't wanna have to choose between these things. But the culture of a company is kinda dictated by how those choices are made, and they were very clearly with the triple 7, they were very clearly choosing. Including my belief is you choose customers first. But they were clearly not choosing customers first. They were choosing the finance first, the shareholders first, ultimately, the investors first.
Speaker 3:Yeah. And that and that came across, you know, at these moments when you you felt finance was ascendant, I mean and that was, you know, early 2000 when, the the mantra was 5 and 5. You know, we can quadruple the the stock price in 5 years. And then, just before the the first MAX crash, Boeing's CFO, had a, meeting with his finance staff, and the stock was about 303.50 at the time. And and he was talking about, you know, that if they kept doing what they were doing, it could get to 800 or 900.
Speaker 3:There there was there was real excitement at at Boeing, you know, that it was finally joining the big leagues of these global powerhouses. So, you know, Dennis Muilenburg repeatedly talked about, you know, how he saw Boeing as a a global industrial champion. And and you you could sense his excitement that after all this time at Boeing that that it it it was, he thought, you
Speaker 4:know, finally
Speaker 3:performing and satisfying Wall Street. But
Speaker 2:Well, Peter, you were you mentioned in the book, the the parallels with Enron. And I just listened to a great podcast about Enron, and I was fascinated about it in, like, day in 2003, 2004. Was it that same kind of underlying mentality? I I know. Bravo to your child or or roommate who who Yeah.
Speaker 2:I don't know.
Speaker 3:Well, I did I did move, and I I moved, into the the earshot of the clarinet lesson. So, that's great. That sound good.
Speaker 1:But the you you know, Adam and I aspire to get our children to do anything as
Speaker 3:we will
Speaker 1:be productive as clarinet. So, honestly, that's very impressive.
Speaker 3:It's inspiring.
Speaker 1:Yes. So sorry. Adam, you wanted
Speaker 2:do you wanna Just, like, what you know, the the the parallels with Enron seemed seemed really spot on and, oh, and and we lost Peter again despite despite the clarinet. Despite the clarinet. In terms of, like, Boeing aspiring to be not just a maker of planes, but this global industrial complex. And and it seemed to work out sort of, I mean, maybe slightly better
Speaker 1:for them, but but not that much better. But, also, like, I how does Boeing have an inferiority complex? Like, I don't understand, like, you're the maker of the triple 7. You are are an American industrial powerhouse. Why do you feel you need Jack Welch like financial engineering to, to appease Wall Street?
Speaker 1:It just seems like it's such a strange inferiority complex for a company to have that they've been it it hadn't achieved all. I mean, because to me, it was an American icon, but apparently, that's not enough.
Speaker 3:Yeah. I mean, that's an interesting point. It it it I mean, that that in in impurity complex, really did come through in in that early 2000 period and and that was in part driven by, you know, Harry Stonecypher who came in from, ironically, from McDonnell Douglas, which had been the also ran, and and really drove home the message that that Boeing, you know, in his words, had never been a, you know, successful business over over the last 50 years that, you know, it hadn't performed well enough, to to meet Wall Street's demands and that, you know, they may be great engineers, but, you know, it people are in you know, companies exist to make money, you know, which is an almost direct quote of his. And and so so Phil Condit, who was Boeing CEO at the time and and had been a great engineer through his career, felt, you know, did did feel, you know, insecure about his position with with Wall Street. There there was one meeting in the late nineties where he was almost in in tears after describing the browbeating he'd taken, in in New York.
Speaker 3:So that so that's that that that's that's what I was getting at when talking about the inferiority complex that that's kind of in the DNA, over the last 20, 30 years.
Speaker 1:Oh, it got that. It's just so corrosive to have your CEO, who is, by the way, coming from in the company that you putatively acquired. I mean, this is McDonnell Douglas, I mean, it's just amazing to me. And, obviously, it's not lost in the Boeing engineers. McDonnell Douglas had a terrible track record, the d c 10.
Speaker 1:And I I'm actually one question I'm dying to ask you, Peter, is I do you you didn't have, the rise and fall of the d c 10, in your in your your bibliography, but I'm sure it, you obviously knew a lot about the d c 10. I mean, clearly, the Boeing engineers knew that the d c 10 had been very problematic. MD 11 had been very problematic. And to have, like, this turkey tell you, you know, that that you're, that the company has been misrun, it just feels so abusive. I mean, it's just shocking.
Speaker 3:Yeah. Yeah. That I mean, it it is I mean, and that's, that you're you're getting at where where the where where the infighting, you know, where where the frustration, you know, comes from on the the side of the long time Boeing employees, because the the d c ten had, you know, had problems, had had repeated crashes. And, you know, McDonnell Douglas had been cited in a well regarded, well read book built to last by Jim Collins as the reference company, you know, the the not visionary company, and and Boeing was cited as the visionary company. So, yeah, it it sounds like you've you've done your share of, of of DC 10, reading over the years.
Speaker 1:Well, and and the the it was a specific book that was recommended to me as I kind of made reference to in in that original Twitter thread when the company I was at, Sun Microsystems, was dealing with a really serious quality problem. And it was recommended to me to understand how corporate culture affects quality, and which it emphatically does, and it did in McDonnell Douglas. And then to to have that infect Boing is just tragic. I mean, it is the and stone cipher so honestly, does not sound sympathetic. It a question that I'm just dying to ask you that I'm just gonna get out earlier rather than later.
Speaker 1:Good god, the rampant infidelity among these executives. I mean, are any of these people true to their spouses? I just couldn't I it is that as was that as shocking to you as it is to to the reader? Maybe I'm
Speaker 3:yeah. Yeah. I mean, that's I that's partly why I included it. I I did I I was I was surprised by that. Yeah.
Speaker 3:Yeah.
Speaker 2:In the first half of the book, I feel like every other page was some notion of some some description of some passing description of infidelity. I you didn't linger with you know, to your credit, Peter, but you also kind of helped understand the mentality of some of these folks. And then one of them was also married to their cousin as one of their, but had to fly to Oregon to get married or so. Anyway, perhaps neither here nor there, but that it was all fairly shocking. I have to say, I mean, obviously, I
Speaker 1:love Peter, I love this book. And I loved every I this book is it is so well written, which is sadly, not the norm, but it it it it is well written. It is so well sourced. And I I I the footnotes are terrific. I love the way you presented some of these details that Adam was talking about where you didn't really editorialize them.
Speaker 1:So I'm just gonna kinda drop this, like, factly true statement out here, and,
Speaker 2:you know, I'll let you,
Speaker 1:the reader, kinda figure out what what yeah. What do you make of this?
Speaker 3:Well, thank thank you. I, you know, I really appreciate your your reading and, you know, and I I felt, and and, you know, your comments and and care you know, care careful, thinking about it. It it, I mean, it really is something that I felt I had to write because, I had seen this shift in the culture, and I I did think that, culture does play a huge role in a company's performance in product and, you know, what we ultimately experience. So thank you.
Speaker 1:And you you I'm sure you were hearing these predictions after the McDonald acquisition, and you got the strike. And I'm sure you've got and so I've been in corporate cultures where you can feel them changing out from underneath you. And as an engineer, you kinda want to be wrong. As an engineer, you're like, you know, I'm actually I hope I'm wrong, but I feel that this is gonna manifest itself in the military aircraft. I'm sure you must be hearing that, you know, in 2000.
Speaker 3:Mhmm. Yeah. And and and that and that's the the the hard thing is that you there's always gonna be a certain amount of, grumbling and and trying to read the tea leaves at any company. So it's trying to understand what is, what what is it truly gonna cause a problem. So it and the thing about the aircraft industry is that it takes place over so many years.
Speaker 3:So even if a mistake is being made, you may not see the evidence of that mistake for 10 years and it and then it plays out over a very long time over the the loss of market share and then eventually, you know, the death of the company. And and and you're you saw that, you know, people in the aerospace industry even, you know, a great book that I read, which is widely read is, you know, The Sporty Game by John Newhouse, which was written in the early seventies. And and in that book, you could sense that McDonnell Douglas was not long for the industry, but it took 20 years for that to to actually play out, 25 years even.
Speaker 1:And so because the time frames are so long, did you have with with all the connections you had at Boeing, did you have any sort of of advanced indicator that the 737 Max posed a a risk to the traveling public? Or was your first indicator the the the the Lion Air crash?
Speaker 3:No. Yeah. I mean, that's a great question. And no. I mean, I I didn't.
Speaker 3:And the the first, there was the Lion Air crash, and and then there there it was unusual, although it was playing out mostly in the trade press, that there was this conflict between Lion Air and Boeing over the the cause of the crash. But to to most people thought it would be a a one off and that Boeing would would fix it, and the and the real shocking thing was the second crash and and the fact that it it was the same problem. And, you know, I I had talked to people at the time who said they they they could not understand how Boeing didn't move with speed to to fix this software issue, which it it knew, you know, within a week of the of the first crash, that it would have to correct.
Speaker 1:And, I mean, certainly, the the just the fact that they knew so quickly that MCAS was involved. And the the fact that they had such a quick hunch tells you how much internally they were afraid this was gonna be an issue. When you first heard that line, aircraft, did you have kind of some immediate realization that, good god, this is the McDonald's that was coming on the news. Was that
Speaker 4:your initial thought?
Speaker 3:It it it wasn't. I I, it it really took the second crash from for me to engage more with the story and and try to understand what happened because it was after the second crash that, it became clear there was a problem.
Speaker 1:I would just like to put in a a short plug for Ethiopian Airlines. Have you ever flown Ethiopian?
Speaker 3:I I have not.
Speaker 1:Ethiopian is great. Have you flown Ethiopian at all?
Speaker 2:No. But our sponsor this week is Ethiopian Air. Ethiopian Woods. Have you no. I have have I have I already talked to your No.
Speaker 2:No. No. But please go.
Speaker 1:Ethiopian is great. No. I took Ethiopian to because, Ethiopian, flies what's called a 5th freedom flight, which is a flight that that, neither I the origin nor the destination or the flag of the carrier from LAX to Dublin on on its way, to to Addis Ababa. And the because I if you draw a line from LA to Addis Ababa, it goes to Dublin. So I flew to from LAX to to Dublin, for my father in law's funeral actually with my with with my then 4 year old daughter.
Speaker 1:They were great. They were such a good airline. They are they were just so I mean, it's just very clear that you have a absolutely the pride of Ethiopia on it. Pilots, flight attendants. I mean, the aircraft were in great shape.
Speaker 1:It was just like a great airline. And I it so when because I kinda feel, Peter, certainly with the Lion Air crash, and you talked with us in the book. There's this kind of sense that, like, that Boeing basically says this is a shoddy airline. Mhmm. And it's a discount carrier.
Speaker 1:It's in Indonesia, and it's kinda gross. It's like this one of your customers, and you are implying, and not just even implying, like, outright stating that they are not that this is pilot error effectively before we know anything about the crash.
Speaker 3:Mhmm. Mhmm.
Speaker 1:And the I mean, it was pretty galling. So with the with the Ethiopian crash, I don't know. I felt that's as a as a person who'd been a passenger on Ethiopian, I was somewhat relieved that they didn't seem to try the same things with Ethiopian and malign the airline. They seem to accept that that there was a, 7% max problem here.
Speaker 3:Yeah. I I it it it became much harder to, say that it was an airline specific problem, after that second crash. Although you you did still hear that that same message and and, you know, that Sam Graves, the congressman from Missouri, was still taking up that message, in in May after the second crash and and saying that, you know, you have to know how to fly the plane. So quietly behind closed doors, it it's lobbyists were still pushing that message. But, yes, pub publicly, after the second crash, Boeing couldn't overtly blame its customer in the way it had with Lion Air.
Speaker 2:Peter, you say that, but then in 2020, when they when they, ungrounded the plane, it sounded like there were still some rumblings of gaslighting of the customers and the pilots.
Speaker 3:Yeah. That's true. And and, yeah, and then David Calhoun, in in 2020, he's asked by New York Times reporters, you know, would the same event have occurred with American pilots on a US airline, and and he asked to to go off the record. And then when they said no, he said, oh, forget it. You you know the answer.
Speaker 3:So, yeah, it's it seems, you know, they can't help themselves, but I I think him asking to go off the record means they also know that they feel they can't say that anymore publicly.
Speaker 2:All the terrible moments and and terrible folks and terrible decisions in the book, that one actually really stuck with me because you also described, you know, people failing in the simulator, saying, you know, there was some activity that the pilots needed to take within 10 seconds.
Speaker 3:Mhmm.
Speaker 2:And basically, every pilot failed this test
Speaker 3:that they that they put
Speaker 2:it through. So it didn't really have to do with with some deficiency of these pilots.
Speaker 3:Yeah. Yeah. You you still had that was, an inspector, in in Dallas who took it upon himself to to run a similar test, to to to what had happened in the crashes. And and that instructor was finding that pilots weren't able to recognize it as quickly as someone who was expecting it in a in a test.
Speaker 1:So so can we just get into the technical details here just for a second? Because I
Speaker 2:got kind
Speaker 1:of a burning question here about the so the angle of attack indicator is very closely linked the problem in that stunningly, they only use a single angle of attack indicator for input to MCAS. Is that is that correct, Peter?
Speaker 3:Yeah. And the idea is that the pilot is the backup, so it's not a single thread. You you have the pilot as a backup.
Speaker 1:This is weird, but but your brain must wanna just, like, pop when people try to make that argument. The pilot doesn't know this is happening. It's like, how can the pilot be a backup when he doesn't know that MCAS has effectively taken over? And the could we talk about the AOA disagree white
Speaker 2:and Brian, before we get there Yes.
Speaker 4:Right.
Speaker 2:Peter I mean, for folks who
Speaker 1:have not read it yet,
Speaker 2:maybe, Peter, you could talk a little bit about MCAS because it's so, kinda critical to understanding this pathology.
Speaker 3:Sure. So so, so m MCAS is a piece of software that's designed to, to intervene if the, pitch of the plane is is going to if the nose is going too high and the plane is likely to enter a stall. And so if the AOA, indicator senses that the angle is too high, it'll, the, tail the the tail, will move and and then the nose of the plane will will push down. So, however, in in the line air case, what happened was that the AOA indicator was reading too high and the the nose was pushed down, and the thought was that pilots would be because when the the, tail is moving, the, there's a wheel in the plane that moves and that's
Speaker 1:to keep
Speaker 3:the plane in in trim. And, the thought was that pilots would notice the wheel moving and would intervene, or that didn't happen because the that wheel also moves, when the plane is meant to, when the plane needs to stay automatically in trim, as happens all through the flight. So in this case, it was just a very surprising set of events, that was soon after takeoff, and it's also unusual, that that would be happening soon after takeoff as as well. Does that help?
Speaker 2:Yeah. Absolutely. And just for, you know, just to emphasize this point, like, MCAS is software, which is overriding effectively the human pilots.
Speaker 3:Right.
Speaker 1:It is software that they don't know about because it it it is it is only in the glossary of of the the their the documents for the Macs. There's no actual because and, Peter, maybe you wanna go into why they fought to to eliminate MCAS even from the documentation for the aircraft?
Speaker 3:Well, the the main thing was that it it would have, potentially changed the level of training needed for the newer version of the 737. It's hugely expensive, for, pilots to train on a new model. So, Boeing from the start wanted to have only level b training, which is what you get if you're training on an iPad, and not level d, which is simulator training. And and if MCAS had been emphasized as a new feature, it might have jeopardized, this level d training, and that would have triggered, you know, potentially, you know, you know, Boeing had promised Southwest Airlines a $1,000,000 in airplane if they did need, simulator training.
Speaker 1:Yeah. And I think that, you know, this particular issue is an is an interesting issue where the customer is not necessarily always right, or at least you need to be transparent with the customer. The customers don't that they want an aircraft that flies like their Exton 737 fleet, so they don't need to retrain. And what Boeing needed to do was have a transparent conversation with Southwest and explain why we we can't do that. Like, what what you're asking for is is actually going to yield the aircraft that's gonna be that is, going to do things behind the pilot's back, And we actually have to explain that.
Speaker 1:But he didn't wanna do that apparently to the customers just because of the cost involved in training.
Speaker 3:That's yeah. That's an interesting point that that and and, there there was a similar situation with the the previous version of the 737 in the the nineties, the the next gen versions. And Southwest, again, was was, at that time was the one wanting the minimal changes, and they wanted, to stick to these old kind of analog style dials on the displays. Boeing knew that others would want more modern dials. They were calling the old ones the steam gauges, and so they sort of quietly, you know, designed in the newer displays, but then told Southwest, you know, they could have their version.
Speaker 3:And then, eventually, Southwest came around, you know, pretty soon after the planes entered service and said, you know, can we get these new dials? And Boeing said, sure. And and all we have to do is switch a button because they had already designed it.
Speaker 1:Is it was Southwest one of the 2 airlines that was act that actually wanted the AOA indicator?
Speaker 3:They didn't, they didn't have, the the raw indicator. So so they so their airplanes would not have gotten that disagree light either.
Speaker 1:Who did have the AOA indicator?
Speaker 2:Who did? I know
Speaker 3:I know that I know that American did. That that came up in the meeting, between Boeing and its pilots later that the one of the union reps took credit for having pushed for the the indicator.
Speaker 1:So could you explain what the AOA indicator is and why it's so important and why it's so germane to these crashes?
Speaker 3:Yeah. It's, so so, in these crashes, that so there's 2 indicators, 1 on each side of the plane. It switches on each flight, which of these indicators is feeding into the, the MCAS. And so in this in the in the in the line air crash, you you had, this you you had a situation where clearly the AOA information was wrong, and that would have been helpful information for the pilots to have. How however, the Lion Air pilots didn't see an an an alert saying AOA disagree because they hadn't bought a separate AOA indicator, because the software had been incorrectly, it had been incorrectly designed so that only the customers who had purchased the indicator got this disagree light.
Speaker 3:So it was it was, you know, it was just a cascading series of errors that that were never disclosed, that were at the time haven't been disclosed to to customers or or the FAA.
Speaker 1:It it really was. And what a disaster to not have that AOA disagreed light. Because I feel like as, you know, someone who's just reading kind of the trade press at the time, there was this kind of strong implication that Lion Air and Ethiopian had opted to not purchase something that would have made the aircraft more reliable. There was some redundancy feature that they hadn't purchased was kind of the implication. And that's actually not the case at all.
Speaker 1:The AOE indicator is a raw indicator that the pilot should necessarily need to see. And so it it is was my read on it. Mhmm. And that not many airlines actually used it. I mean, American apparently did.
Speaker 1:Apparently, there's at least 1 or 2 others. But most airlines did not opt for it. Is is that correct?
Speaker 3:Yeah. And that from from what I was told that the AO indicators, it's often used by Navy pilots. That's a that's a Mhmm. Something that they believe they need to land on, you know, carriers. And so, you know, AOA and hitting the you know, making sure their tail isn't hitting the the deck is is important to them.
Speaker 3:So so it so it's important to some pilots. It's not important to others, but it would have been important to all pilots and especially the maintenance crew to know that the AOA was an issue, after that first flight.
Speaker 2:Especially astounding because the the flight if I understood this correctly, that same aircraft that, that was that led to that was put in that Lion Air crash failed in a similar way in a previous flight, but the deadhead pilot, did what you had had mentioned earlier, noticed the the trim wheel moving, and they were able to correct it. But then the ground crew never got that indicator. So even though that flight even though the previous flight and that same aircraft had gone through the same scenario that could have easily have led to that same crash, the ground crew, even when alerted of that, couldn't make the appropriate repairs.
Speaker 3:Yeah. Yeah. It's it's chilling. And and the, you know, the one the one of the Boeing CEOs whom who met with American Airlines pilots later told them on your airplane, this wouldn't have happened, be because you have you know, you bought the AOA indicator, essentially.
Speaker 1:But but it's like you bought the undercoat on the car or like the racing stripe. I mean, like, the thing right? I mean, like, the thing you bought, like, oh, I get it. You know, for a navy pilot, you know, it's but it it's a little bit skeuomorphic. And the the idea that Lion Air certainly was not there was not a a common understanding.
Speaker 1:Even it sounds like at the FAA that the AOA was actually load bearing with respect to the safety of the aircraft.
Speaker 3:Yeah. And and it it it is something that, later the FAA was surprised to learn about. And and it it it, you know, this decision to not update the software and fix the problem, was was made at a at a level, you know, after a safety review board meeting of of Boeing and and was not that was not shared with the FAA at the time.
Speaker 1:Yeah. So I because it seems to me that the the the fact that there was a I actually cannot wrap my head around the fact that a single indicator was being used to fly the aircraft. I mean, it just feels like and, clearly, some engineers did have an allergic reaction to this and did point out that that that we should at least be looking at both of these indicators. If they disagree, let the pilot fly the aircraft, which is what they I I know they're did their they have since done. But I I think that this kind of is a is a decent segue, Peter, to to to Curtis Eubank who if there's a hero to the story, am I wrong to read to read too much heroism into Curtis Eubank, a young engineer who seems to, be really trying to speak truth to power on the the peril of having a single AOA indicator.
Speaker 1:Is that a is that a fair read? Yeah.
Speaker 3:I mean, he's somebody who at, you know, great risk to his, his career, you you know, stood stood up, both both before and and after the crashes to to ask for, you know, to add to ask for more safety instrumentation on the plane. He he the the the the reason that the AOA indicator is, you know, seems to be ancient is that the the the 737 was designed in the sixties, and it it does in some cases have these, you know, the engineers call them single thread designs. But in this case, the single thread was considered okay because the pilots, were supposed to be the backup. As we discussed, you know, that was no longer that that should have been reexamined when pilots aren't even aware of this feature that had been added. But UBank and others at at Boeing, who who proposed to executives, you know, they they they were allergic to to to the alerting system.
Speaker 3:They they felt that the alerting system was outdated for the pilots, and they proposed a synthetic, that with something called synthetic airspeed, which would have, which would have shut off, what you know, which would have prevented some of these, which would have prevented MCAS from activating on the basis of one single outlandish reading. It it there would have been a second pair of eyes on, sensors throughout the aircraft to prevent it from doing outlandish things on the basis of of bad pieces of information.
Speaker 1:And so you obviously I mean, I gather that you talked to Eubank for the book. Is that I
Speaker 3:can't I can't talk about my sources for the Oh,
Speaker 1:fair enough. Okay.
Speaker 2:Yeah. Okay. So I I guess
Speaker 1:I guess I I thought that he'd been quoted verbatim from you, but I guess not.
Speaker 3:But he's He's written he's written many letters to, to that's what I meant about him talking, you know, speaking out after, yeah, that he he he's wrote at least 2 letters to congress, and one filing to the FAA talking about, talking about what further improvements were needed on the MAX.
Speaker 1:And and this is all obviously after both crashes. I mean, I I had to say, like, I I wonder as an engineer, there are times you really don't wanna be vindicated, And you kind of like, god, I I hope I'm wrong. And in, you know, in in in his case, not only was he right, but with with so many so many lives lost, that must be psychologically very must weigh on 1. I've thought of any you made reference to the the challenge or disaster in at the end of the book. And I know that many of the engineers there were decisions that they didn't make.
Speaker 1:They, ultimately, really weighed on them. And it must have been really difficult for these 737 engineers who had been kind of shouted down.
Speaker 3:Yeah, it's I mean it and you mentioned the Challenger crash. I mean, the engineers who were involved in that, went went to their graves, you know, still talking about, you know, talking to people they'd worked with on that. And and did they do enough to raise alarms? So I yeah. I mean, it it's the the difficult thing with this is that it's easy to think of your role as being just one small piece of it.
Speaker 3:And and it it is so compartmentalized that maybe there's a part of you that can say, well, you you know, it wasn't me because I only did x, you know, piece of equipment or x system. And and that's why that's why I focus so much, time in the book on, you know, leaders like Joe Sutter, who who did see their role as trying to make sure that everyone saw how their small piece of the project contributed to the whole. And and it and that that's a real talent. And, you know, and people I came across who, you know, could explain that were, you know, I I just had huge respect for.
Speaker 1:Totally. And then, I mean, this whole and, again, it's, you know, working together right at the triple 7. And the the whole idea that you not only do we all have an important role to play, but we also have a responsibility. We all each of us has a responsibility. And one of the things that I definitely wonder is the because, obviously, a bunch of us here are software engineering or software engineers.
Speaker 1:And, you know, in we've got a lot of software being written right now that is being used in ways that are, are ethically questionable for sure. And, I mean, I wonder what was going through the minds of the engineers who are writing the MCAS code or the engineers at at Collins Aerospace was the the sub on the AOA indicator. But I did they write the MCAS? Was MCAS written at Boeing?
Speaker 3:MCAS is written by a team at Boeing, which handed the specifications to to Collins. So, the, the the the issue was that the the team at Boeing had not thought carefully through how they were designing it. So yeah.
Speaker 1:And but the actual MCAS software itself, the software that is kind of acting on this single sensor and is going to effectively fly the aircraft, that software is is Boeing authored software.
Speaker 3:It it it's a it's a Boeing design that's handed to the supplier to to execute the the yeah.
Speaker 2:Okay. So I I can't yeah. So I mean,
Speaker 1:for us in software, this is an incredibly germane question. It's like because Mhmm. I think we were I mean, like, Adam, aren't aren't you, like, dying to see the actual forklift of this thing?
Speaker 2:I mean, sort of. I'm also just, like, terrible. That that's the part that of the book that made me so itchy was thinking about, like, there's a person who wrote that code. There's a person who made the change to say the most I can move the flaps is 0.6 degrees, but then it changed later on to be whatever it was 2 degrees.
Speaker 3:Yeah.
Speaker 2:And just the the I mean, either it's a senior engineer making that and they should feel itchy or it's a junior engineer who is just being set up to fail. And in both cases, it I I think there's so many other failings in the book, but that was that just felt so close because yeah. Brian, I can imagine kind of the simplicity in some ways of the code, the the the facileness of that code.
Speaker 1:Yeah. Well, and just I'd be and I think it it's an interesting kind of it's either a senior engineer who's just like, okay. I'm gonna take responsibility for it. But it feels like it's much more likely a junior engineer that is or or someone who is, if not junior in years, certainly, not questioning why are we making this change and what are the consequences of it, it feels.
Speaker 3:Yeah. I mean, by the time that change in MCAS was introduced to extend it to low speed situations, it was considered that the bulk of the work of the project was done. I was told that a lot of people had moved on to other projects by that point, and there and there was a small team that was assigned, to to work on it. So those those are all great questions. Yeah.
Speaker 3:It's I mean, it and it and it is, it's incredible to to to think of type typing on a computer
Speaker 2:earlier, is that there was a feeling, I I believe, I to it earlier, is that there was a feeling, I I believe you described, among pilots about Boeing that they preferred it to Airbus because the the Boeing software would never take over. That the that the pilot was in control in a way more deterministically than than they were with Airbus. Mhmm. And and was that right? And can you describe that that kind of scene as as the pilots were informed about MCAS and their reaction?
Speaker 3:Yeah. Because it it Boeing had been considered always sort of the the pilots air aircraft maker that they they didn't, with the Airbus, I mean, the the simplest way understanding is that they, they have they have side stick controllers at Airbus. And so when one when the pilot on one side makes a change, the pilot pilot on the other side doesn't feel that instantly, in his controller. So there have been situations where confusion, crashes have happened because one pilot is unaware of what the other is doing. But with Boeing, both control yokes move and, there's the the the Boeing has continued to have that tactile feel in in all their designs.
Speaker 3:So, but at the same time, planes are mostly controlled by flight control software now. So, the fact that, the fact that software, you know, took such control of the Boeing plane was was shocking because at Boeing, the the thought had been that, yes, there was software, but but pilots are still in control of it.
Speaker 1:Well, it it just I I wonder, Peter, if the software engineers that were working on that had that kind of that blood on the seats meant as you call that. Was that a Joe Sutterism or where where is blood on the seats?
Speaker 3:I'm sorry. You you kind of you broke up a little bit.
Speaker 1:Well, you talk about blood on the seats is a and I'm trying to is that a is that a Joe Sutterism, or where does that come from?
Speaker 3:I'm sorry. Can can you hear me?
Speaker 1:Yes. I can hear you. Can you not hear me?
Speaker 3:Yeah. I can hear you fine. Okay. Yeah. That was that would so this is the the blood on
Speaker 4:the seat covers. In
Speaker 3:the book. Yeah. This this was, a, a a product safety manager who I talked to who who was really, you know, was really giving an example of, how the culture was in in the nineties and earlier that you had, a strong understanding that product safety had to be paramount, that those people had to be represented at meetings. And he remembered, you know, at a meeting on the 737 next gen, someone had proposed some changes to the fuel tank that he he thought would leave a potential single point failure, and and he stood up and said, how much how much blood do you want on the seat covers? And then, eventually, the design was changed.
Speaker 3:But that, you know, that that was what it what it took. You know, you you you needed to have somebody stand up and and say that at meetings. And from everything I've been told, at the max, you you didn't have that. And and it's because, the the finance function became dominant and the engineering function less so. And it was felt that you would risk your career if you stood up and said something like that.
Speaker 3:Man.
Speaker 1:And just to just to not be to have that direct connection, I think, is so important. And it just feels like those who are writing software for the MCAS and I can say I cannot wrap my brain around outsourcing flight control software to a subcontractor. Be I I just feel that, you know, nobody cares about your software like you do, and I I think it's very hard to outsource responsibility. It's very hard to I think it's it's obviously not impossible and clearly, like, subcontractors are important for any large complicated endeavor. But, boy, it feels like they outsource.
Speaker 1:I I it's shocking to me that that that ultimately, they were writing a specification and not the software itself for for the
Speaker 3:cast. Yeah. Well well, Boeing had had, over time, it's it's again, you know, to cut costs, it's it's handed responsibilities for huge, you know, pieces of the airplane. And on the 787, they handed over, you know, not just manufacturing work, but complete design on on sections of the airplane. And and now and and that led to huge problems on the 787 with, you know, ultimately 50,000,000,000 in costs.
Speaker 3:And and and and now, as the 787 is, experiencing these these manufacturing defects, you you have this hunt, you know, among suppliers worldwide to to try to understand, you know, why these defects are happening.
Speaker 2:Well, and and you say cost cutting, but I I thought this was particularly stark that the 7 37 max was taken on because they thought they could do it for 3,000,000,000 as opposed to a new plane costing 20,000,000,000. Were the are those the right numbers?
Speaker 3:Yeah. I think it was 22 and f for the for the derivative. And, yeah, the new plane could could cost as much as 20. And, you know, unfortunately, be because of that experience with the 787, that that may have played into Boeing's decision making as well because they had sunk so much in the 787. It it would have been difficult to swallow another new development.
Speaker 3:But if Boeing had followed the design plan it had laid out in the early 2000, the it would have had the 787 done years previously, and it would have introduced a new 737. And I was told by John Leahy, who ran sales at Airbus, that would have been potentially career threatening for him because he had assured, others at Airbus that that Boeing wouldn't do that.
Speaker 1:Yeah. When if you think of, like, a a triple 7 like aircraft that is targeted at the 737 market with with with an all glass cockpit and all of the it just feels like they could have yes. Sorry. I can
Speaker 3:hear you. Yeah.
Speaker 2:I can hear you. Yeah.
Speaker 1:Yeah. Yeah. It it it it so I guess one question I would have is did so, I mean, economically, financially, strictly financially, this was ruinous, this decision that they did with 7 that they made with 737 max. Has Boingoing internalized that these were ruinous decisions, and these were the wrong decisions, and we actually need to return to the old pre McDonald's. Is that something I mean, because it feels like a lot of these people still have jobs.
Speaker 1:So I I wonder how deeply that's been internalized. Gary, it's such a good streak there.
Speaker 2:Yeah. Really
Speaker 1:This is what my dishwasher does, man. I'm telling you. Bosch dishwasher does the exact same thing. Long stretch. You think we're past it?
Speaker 1:And then it's e 24. No dishes.
Speaker 2:Hey hey, Matt. I I noticed that you joined a little while ago as a speaker. While Peter's gone, can you tee up a question, or or or did you have a comment you wanted to make?
Speaker 4:Yeah. So, I mean, I I did have a couple of questions there about you know, firstly, since all airplanes today are fly by wire, really, it's the computer flying the plane. How different is MKS from from any of that other than just a shoddy implementation of 1? The second part that I've got is really surrounding the split between the notion that, like, there is substandard carriers crashing and the fact that there are options. And
Speaker 2:there is
Speaker 4:is there some level of attitude there of, like, well, of course, you'd buy the whole plane if you were doing the responsible thing, where, you know, the notion internally is at least that the fact that you didn't buy the the entire airplane and all of its bells and whistles, was that considered to be a sign of a substandard operator even though on the business side, clearly, no one is buying all of them.
Speaker 2:Well, so 2 things on that. I mean, all of these features seem to be standard on Airbus. And how crazy is it that you have an airplane with, like, an in app purchase
Speaker 1:for a critical safety feature? I know.
Speaker 2:I just
Speaker 1:have like the, sorry folks. Screen the diverter or license manager crashed through the cockpit and we no longer I mean, yeah, exactly.
Speaker 2:So can you I mean, that imagine writing that piece of software. Like, you're saying that this safety piece of software I just wrote requires them to input a key to unlock this? Like, I mean, I think like, you need to walk away at that moment. Right?
Speaker 1:You would hope. You would and that is I mean, at what point does a software engineer stand up and say, look, I'm
Speaker 2:not gonna I'm not gonna push this. I'm not going to this is not right. This is this is not
Speaker 1:we're not going about this the right way. This is wrong by our customers. I mean, that's and I mean, even aside from being safety critical, it it is hope we can get it back here. Well, those are those are great questions. I mean, I definitely have the, because the other thing I I find galling about this is the fact that all of this is happening without the, the pilot's awareness.
Speaker 1:Is just I mean, without any indicator, without other there he is. Hold on. Alright, Peter. I think we got you back.
Speaker 2:Peter, are you there?
Speaker 1:Nope. Getting there.
Speaker 2:Oh, there we go. Hello? Yes.
Speaker 1:Hey, Peter. You're back. Hello? So yeah. I'd Peter, I'm not sure if you if you heard it, but, math yes.
Speaker 3:I can hear you. Hey.
Speaker 1:Yeah. This is all because you praised Twitter faces early on. I'm telling you, you got it. It's, the, Matt, I think you you got a good question for Peter.
Speaker 4:Yeah. So
Speaker 3:Go ahead. Yeah.
Speaker 4:I had 2 of them there. So, firstly, to what degree within Boeing is it sort of considered that, you had mentioned earlier that the notion was that these carriers that were seeing crashes were irresponsible in some way, and, like, was there some sort of a disconnect on the business side and the engineering side where, of course, anyone who's reasonable would have bought most of the options on the plane, and versus, you know
Speaker 1:Oh, we we had a
Speaker 4:standard operators who keep optioning it down. I think I said it better the first time, Brian.
Speaker 1:Yeah. Well, it's just generally surprising that so much of the aircraft is, like, optional.
Speaker 3:I'm not I'm not sure I'm getting you anymore.
Speaker 1:You are we can hear you.
Speaker 3:Oh, okay.
Speaker 1:We
Speaker 4:yeah.
Speaker 3:So, this is just about the the shift. You're you're asking about the shift to make making more functions options as opposed to standard?
Speaker 4:I mean, more there seems to be this notion that it's the bottom tier carriers who are having problems. And, obviously, the only way that you can sort of have to define who's a bottom tier carrier is that whether or not they've bought the options on it. So it to what degree was engineering aware of the optionality of these features versus just assuming that, well, of course, everyone would have that?
Speaker 3:Yeah. I mean, that's a great question because, you you I mean, just communication is a big issue here. You you you and that this came up in re reports after the fact by the, you know, joint authorities, looking at, what went wrong. I mean, they they looked at just siloization and and that, certain units would have information and others wouldn't. And so and and you had even, you know, months before the MAX was delivered, you know, one one engineer asked another, and this came out in the congressional investigation, you know, what what happens if if we have a faulty AOA, and then the other engineer says if that happens, MCAS shuts down immediately.
Speaker 3:So so even at that late stage, there was there was bad information going around, and there was an assumption about what was happening, which wasn't which wasn't true.
Speaker 1:And then and that, if you could just take a question then?
Speaker 4:Yeah. The the other one was, you know, how different is MCAS from other types of fly by wire systems that we're more used to seeing? Right? At this point, you know, in pretty much every aircraft, it's actually the computer flying the plane and the pilot flying the computer. And, you know, aside from whatever illusion the pilot has that he is in control Mhmm.
Speaker 4:Like, it's how is MCAS substantially different, or is it just that it's based off faulty sensor data?
Speaker 3:Yeah. It's, it's it's not you know, it it it the the people working at the time, you know, thought of it as just another function. There there there isn't, you know, there's another feature that controls the spoilers on landing, which they, you know, some people that I talked to thought that, you know, they consider that to be more of a change than than MCAS. I mean, the the issue was was that, it's it's, you know, it's one thing that was said to me was that the there should have been more scrutiny because MCAS is is it's you know, the tail is a really powerful controlled surface. And within, you know, just 30, 40 seconds, it's it's able to crash the plane.
Speaker 3:So, the the so that that's one critical feature of it. But in but in terms of, it being software, controlling, software involved in the flight controls, you're you're right. That's not that's not unusual.
Speaker 1:That's an interesting point though about the tail because, I mean, I I do feel that part of what makes these crashes so tragic is that they all of them lost all lives
Speaker 4:Mhmm.
Speaker 1:Which it does feel like in that regard, it looks like the j l 123. It looks like the rudder hard over to the 737 suffered from. You made reference to the the flight 427 US Air and and and the, you know, growing up in Colorado, the the the Colorado Springs crash, the UA 585. It does feel like the tail deserves special treatment from an engineering perspective because it feels like it's being activated at low altitude when you got the rudder and ailerons are being I mean, is that a fair read? I'm not a pilot.
Speaker 1:Is that a it does feel like it's it's a high risk surface.
Speaker 3:Yeah. And and that's and that's why some people early on in the development, you know, they they didn't you know, one axiom is, you know, if you've got a hardware problem, that you should have a hardware solution. And so when this this pitch up tendency was noticed because of the bigger engines, you know, one thought was that they could put, what's called on the wings, and that would might change the performance. But, the the software has the advantage of being quicker and and and cheaper, and so the the software approach was was used. And in in high speed, it was tied to 2 sensors.
Speaker 3:That was one point we didn't cover, but but the, initially, because it was acting only at high speeds, it it would have responded to to both the AOA and and this other sensor called the accelerometer. And then it was only later that it was added to this low speed regime. So the accelerometer just didn't factor into it because you're you're at a low speed.
Speaker 1:Well, and it's you have these, like, small decisions that are accruing, and people are losing track clearly losing track of the larger consequence and then it seems like it was very consequential to start engaging this thing at low speed.
Speaker 3:Yeah. And and again, you didn't apparently you didn't have someone who you didn't have a Joe Sutter figure who was keeping track of all these incremental changes and was noting, how how these pieces fit into the whole. The the manager of the program after the first flight test got a congratulatory call from from one of his managers and then and got some additional stock. So so it's possible that his mind was elsewhere.
Speaker 1:Well, some yeah. I'm glad you brought him up because I've got Michael Teal underlined here. The so Michael Teal was the chief engineer. You point out that he has no direct reports or or or the the organization doesn't report anything, which seems like a a funny way of doing it.
Speaker 3:Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 1:Were were you shocked that he seemed to know so little about how important the single AOA was?
Speaker 3:Yeah. And and you you you you had that from him. You you you had that from his manager who's a a business unit, VP, and you you had that from the chief of safety at the FAA just professing very little technical knowledge and, you know, very little awareness of what technical changes were being made. And and it it it, you know, it it just struck me that at every stage, you you know, it there there was, Keith Leverkuhn was the, manager who supervised Teal, and and he summarized the late change to MCAS as being, you know, problem found, you know, solution available. So that was the level of briefing and technical discussion that was going up the chain.
Speaker 1:Did you find that shocking? I mean, I guess what what I definitely have for you is, like, what you surely had some moments in the story where you just couldn't believe what you were seeing. Certainly, as a reader, I had moments where I couldn't believe what I was reading. What were some of those moments
Speaker 3:for you? I I was surprised by, I I was surprised by infidelities. We, you know, we discussed earlier. I I was surprised, I, you know, I was surprised that there isn't more, that there wasn't more discussion, you you know, you know, open discussion. And and after the I continue to be surprised that, Boeing's, you know, executives have continued to stonewall and and, you know, haven't engaged in any kind of meaningful discussion and that there hasn't been any real housecleaning at the company.
Speaker 3:That that's surprising to me.
Speaker 1:It so that's surprising to me too. I also I have to say surprised that I was going just to the Boeing website in preparation for this, and they're remarkably candid though about the 737 max.
Speaker 2:Mhmm.
Speaker 1:And they've got this kind of memoriam to the the the the lion air. I mean, is does that reflect a deeper cultural change in Boeing, or does that feel superficial to you?
Speaker 3:I'd have to look specifically at what you're, talking about there. But, they, I mean, if if if if you read the there was an interview that, Boeing's current commercial airplane chief, Dan Diehl, gave to Dominic Gates at Seattle Times, and, there was not any open reflection. It it was, you know, declined to comment, but anything to do with the 737 max. So, yes, in situations Boeing controls, they, I think, control the message, but I haven't seen them engage in any meaningful dialogue about it since, you know, since since Dave Calhoun became CEO.
Speaker 1:And what has their reaction did to the book?
Speaker 3:They've not commented publicly on it.
Speaker 1:But
Speaker 3:Yeah. Because it's Nor nor is the FAA.
Speaker 1:Really? You just feel like this is such an opportunity to I I I mean, welcome the book, first of all, but also, like, we I mean, if if people are dedicated to changing Boeing and change the FAA. The book presents, I think, a a great opportunity to have that discussion.
Speaker 3:Yeah. I mean, it's it's a real, I mean, that I maybe I would count myself. That's that's surprising to me as as as well, but that may be, you know, part of the public relations strategy.
Speaker 1:Yeah. Actually, Simeon, sorry. You got your head up. What did you have questions for Peter?
Speaker 5:I'm I'm so glad that you mentioned the FAA because it's sort of related. I I remember at the time reading about the role of the FAA, the role of, you know, the operators, it's all seems quite puzzling. And then, something that was mentioned at the time was the competitive pressure from the Airbus, what is it, a 320neo, as an alternative, narrow body, aircraft. And it got me to wondering to if and to what extent there was a sort of a Team USA, factor especially considering the the FAA.
Speaker 3:Yeah. I mean, that that's a a really interesting point and that may have played into it as well because there was this cultural shift at the FAA, where managers at the FAA felt that they part of their role was in speeding designs toward completion and and meeting, you know, quote, stakeholder needs, and that meant doing things on the manufacturer's schedules. So that so that's what kinds of pressure the FAA engineers were experiencing when it came to, Boeing models. At the same time, I I talked to, you know, some specialists who were notice noting at the FAA that, you know, chain changes that, you know, the FAA would let Boeing, not meet, you know, with the with the MAX, not meet current regulations on some of the fuel tank designs, but it was insisting on, you know, circuit breaker, surge protection, and and things like that on the a the a 320neo design. So I I did wonder myself about whether the FAA was playing into this team America mentality.
Speaker 1:Which could ultimately ended up very much harming team America. If that that was the it it just like I think that just like the financial engineering, I mean, it ultimately, this isn't just the wrong thing to do. It doesn't even serve the the goal. It's like we ultimately we effectively the even if the regulator viewed their role serving Boing, they undermine Boing by allowing them to by by not regulating them better. Is that a I mean, do you is that a total imperative?
Speaker 3:In the long in the long run, yeah. I mean, you you see how it plays out in the long run. And if if you don't balance customers and employees communities in the long run, that that hurts you.
Speaker 1:So, yeah, I mean, I guess, what what what is the kind of the the the the lesson for for, you know, those folks that are you gonna get a lot of folks that are technologists who are software engineers? What what what do you feel is kind of the some of the lessons that we can kind of apply to other organizations here?
Speaker 3:Yeah. So, well, I mean, we've covered some of them, but it's, you know, listening to, you know, listening to employees, you know, valuing employees, views, views, not structuring an organization so that it's top down to the point that, bad news isn't filtering up. I mean, there there were many moments that I read in the book where where you had managers, you know, all been insisting that people not give them bad news.
Speaker 1:Right.
Speaker 3:And that is always harmful. So it's it's just being willing to engage in this open dialogue and to change your mind if if you need to. And and it, you know, maybe it would have been inconvenient or not the plan to to develop a new plane. But it it would have been the better strategic decision.
Speaker 1:I I'm glad you bring up bad news because, I I mean, this is certainly one of my rubric for for technological leadership is how well do you deal with bad news. When you're solving anything ambitious, there's going to be bad news. And you've got to have an organization that encourages that bad news, as opposed to trying to to to to squelch it. And I think that because ultimately, like, whether you're receptive to the bad news or not, doesn't change the fact that it's bad news, which part of the challenge here, Queerly.
Speaker 3:Exactly. Yeah.
Speaker 2:Yeah. You know, Peter, it there's if there's a villain in the book and and there actually are probably several, it's this sort of Jack Welch and the disciples, you know, shoveling all of the the value and virtue of Boeing, into this furnace of capitalism. And one of the dark thoughts I had as reading through it was just, is this the kind of high entropy state of of all organizations, you know, because it seemed like Boeing's engineering kind of held together, but it was so easy to unravel, so hard to build and then so easy to unravel.
Speaker 3:Yeah. That's that's really well said. I mean, that that is, you know, that that is ultimately what what I took away from this experience of moving, you know, here to Seattle and and finding this company that was so embedded in the fabric of the city and the history. And it's moved to Chicago with within a few years of my being here, and and now it's unrecognizable, from from what it was. So it it didn't take long at all.
Speaker 3:And it's not alone either. And there's not you could you could write the same story about lots of other American companies.
Speaker 1:And do you feel there's a path back for Boeing?
Speaker 3:I think you would need to change. I I think you would need to to do what we were talking about, and and it would need to, in in, you know, fully accept that fully fully, you know, change change the strategy and and and accept that, you know, you need to return to what existed before. But I'm I'm not sure that that, that that's happening.
Speaker 1:It's tough to internalize. Matt, got to go, probably time for one more question for Peter.
Speaker 2:Yeah.
Speaker 4:So I've got, to what degree do you think the f 35 is involved in this? Because the story I had always heard for Boeing buying out McDonnell Douglas was that, basically, McDonald lost the f 35 program. Their commercial program was basically in shambles, and that Boeing thought it would add more credibility in terms of the government bidding on the f 35 contract. Needless to say, that didn't work out too well for him, but that McDonald was not so much purchased for its commercial division as much as it was for its noncommercial division. And, obviously, there is some level of cultural difference between what you're looking for in a fighter jet and what you're looking for in a commercial airliner.
Speaker 4:I don't know if you have any comments
Speaker 3:Yeah. No. That's that's that's really interesting. I mean, it and it does show how, you know, a decision made for one reason can have these cascading effects. And and certainly, you know, certainly, I have been told that McDonnell Douglas wouldn't have been on the block and and if it hadn't lost the the f 35.
Speaker 3:So, the you know, again, I I think, you know, there were also moments in the book where, the the military side of Boeing was was pushing the leadership to do things, you know, for expedient reasons for military contracts. You know, let's move the 747 production to to California so it helps us helps us get military so, yeah, if if if that did factor into the thinking, I I think it's it's another example of of expediency, you know, triumphing over the just just the self confidence, you know, that that's what Boeing became what it was in the jet age because of its self confidence and its its, you know, the the beliefs that its products were were best. And and it didn't need these these extras.
Speaker 4:You you could also make the argument about I mean, expediency is one way to put it. But on the other hand, if you think about the sorts of autopilots that are being engaged on these aircraft, right, modern jet fighters could not be flown by a human. Right? They rely entirely on their computers to not fall out of the sky.
Speaker 3:Yeah.
Speaker 4:And so one could imagine that if you've just lost the f 35 program and you have a bunch of autopilot programmers lying around around at around the same time you were starting. I I don't know if Boeing had that level of cross pollination between the divisions or, like, not being a Boeing covering journalist, I don't really know how they operate. Yeah.
Speaker 1:I I have the say that same question because it seems to me that they are pretty different sides of the house. Is that is there any cross pollination between the military and the commercial side?
Speaker 3:Yeah. They I mean, they've they've they've tried to, I mean, the the the hope of management is that, you know, while you you have these people doing essentially the same thing, we should, you know, we should be able to get synergy and cut costs and and, you know, you can merge, you know, the the flight test and have military pilots, you know, doing what commercial pilots are doing. And and but often that ends up being counterproductive because the you you do need to have a separate military flight test operation because those pilots know fighters best, and and the commercial pilots know on a daily basis how anybody is actually flying the plane, which a military test pilot doesn't know. And and that, you know, also played into the the the MAX because the flight test operation was led by a former military pilot who who didn't have that kinda daily immersion in in a what a commercial pilot is doing.
Speaker 1:And Yeah.
Speaker 4:Just out of out of curiosity, do you have any idea what the the background and pedigree of that military pilot was? Just only asking because, basically, I have heard that the b two spirit has something that's almost exactly MKS, bearing in mind that it's a delta ring, so, like, they fall out of the sky if you don't computer them anyway.
Speaker 3:Sorry. You you broke up after b two spirit?
Speaker 4:Just you know, I know you've mentioned that you there was a military pilot there. Was he transport? Was he test pilot, fighter, bomber?
Speaker 3:Oh, fight this is I I was talking about Craig Bombin who who, is is is still currently the the head of Boeing flight test. But, yeah, his his experience is fighters primarily.
Speaker 1:Yeah. And then I think we we got I know, a couple questions. Just if you got Peter, you got time for 2 more questions. Sure. The yeah.
Speaker 1:The the, one question came in from from from Jean Kim who I don't know if he's here or not, but wanted to get your reaction to the the CEO congressional testimony. I mean, did you did you feel there there were I I actually you know, you made reference to the the committee report, which I thought was actually very good. I I got into it because of the book. But did you feel that the committee were there questions that should have been asked that weren't? Or how'd you find the the the testimony there?
Speaker 3:Yeah. I I mean, I think that the house committee, you know, really did dig into the the the issue and, that I relied heavily. And as you can see from me in the footnotes, I but I you know, in the testimony, I guess the frustrating thing was that in all these congressional hearings, you'll you'll have these grandstanding questions. And you had a great opening question from, Richard Blumenthal from Connecticut who asked Muilenburg, you know, when did you learn that the MCAS would not be in the flight manual? Because he had dissembled about that question on a in a Fox, business interview after the Lion Air crash and had led viewers to believe that MCAS was in the manual.
Speaker 3:And as, you know, Blumenthal well knew, you know, by at least February after the first crash, it had been brought to his attention that, a a pilot, you know, in the organization had raised concerns about, changes in the MCAS and what had been told the FAA. So so that would have been a great thread to continue following and continue asking, you know, who who did you talk to? What were you told? You know, really, what did you know and when did you know it? Especially in that period between the two crashes, would would be really important to know.
Speaker 1:Yeah. Interesting. And I I you should know that, Adam is a as a son of the great state of Connecticut. Are you living your Connecticut flag right now?
Speaker 2:I'm a nutmeg nutmegger for sure. Although, Dick Blumenthal was not well loved, growing up. But, yeah, I'm I'm I that that questioning that you described, was terrific. And I would also say that it was the most positively I've felt about Ted Cruz ever in your description in the book. Sorry.
Speaker 3:I'm I I think I missed the the end of that.
Speaker 2:Oh. Ted Cruz came off well in your book, which was surprising to me and and disturbing to me.
Speaker 3:Yeah. He did he did, he he put on his, his his his his tough lawyer hat, and and he did he did put Muilenburg on the spot.
Speaker 1:Well and I was actually relieved that there was a bipartisan agreement that the FAA has actually outsourced too much of this. And it sounds like they've made at least some they've wound back some of the regulatory changes, which, you know, when in a divided tone when parties agree on something, you know it's gotta be really acute. So and then one of the questions the last question for you, Peter, was the, the original issue that the test pilot Ed Wilson ran into at kind of the outside of the flight envelope. That issue, how's how severe would that issue have? Would would they not have been able to get certification?
Speaker 1:Had they not fixed that issue at all? Would they if they done nothing, if they'd not done anything for Ram Cast, would they have failed their certification?
Speaker 3:They this has been described, you know, the the you know, it it was raised as a, you know, this is a certification issue. It it needs to be fixed. I I think, you know, people that I've talked to have said that you could have addressed it, in a different way, you know, by restricting the, loading in the back of the plane, and you could've maybe changed the flight envelope of the plane and and not and, you know, but that would have been a separate conversation to to to have that, you know, you you would have potentially not loaded, you know, in certain in passengers into certain conditions. So so yeah. I mean, it it is fascinating to think that you you may not have even needed MCAS at all if if a different approach has taken.
Speaker 1:Yeah. And certainly, if they had done the what what was clearly the approach that was preferred by some of your sources of actually taking the triple seven approach and Mhmm. Really not I I do think it's funny. 737 max had so much technical debt. They had no way of naming it because it would have been the 737 it should have been the 737-1000.
Speaker 1:Right? But they Right. Didn't wanna call it the 1,000. So that's like just the it's there's kind of a a cruel irony there. Well, Peter, thank you very, very much for enduring the rough road that is Twitter Spaces.
Speaker 3:Thank you. I I I, you know, I'm I'm happy to be here. You know, these are great questions and, you know, and thanks so much for reading the book so carefully.
Speaker 1:It it was a it was a great book. I honestly again, very well written. I I I mean, it was it was a it was a page turner, I feel like.
Speaker 2:I I I don't know
Speaker 1:that I've ripped through a book this quickly since bad blood. I I mean, it was it it was a and it definitely had some bad blood overtones, but I actually feel that there's a lot more to learn here than there is from because I feel like there there's a lot that feels familiar. And certainly, Adam, you must have felt that there's a lot that's familiar to you.
Speaker 2:If it I mean, that's since hence the dark feelings about kind of corporations in general. And and, Peter, I would just say I I I read this on a plane recently. I did check-in, that the aircraft I was on was an Airbus aircraft before I cracked the book just because I felt like I was already nervous enough about that.
Speaker 3:But but but but congratulations on
Speaker 2:the fucking the acclaim that it's getting. The it's it's awesome and, and and well deserved acclaim.
Speaker 1:And absolutely. And I think this should be required rating for engineers of of of all variety. I would like to see, of course, we in software engineering, need to take responsibility for our roles in in this. So should be mandatory reading. So thank you very much for a terrific book.
Speaker 3:Thank you. Thanks again. And, yeah. I'm I'm happy to endure it. It it wasn't an endure, you know, so much to endure after all.
Speaker 3:We've really enjoyed it.
Speaker 2:Excellent. Alright. Thank you very much. Thank you everyone for the
Speaker 1:great questions, and we'll, we'll see you next time.
Speaker 3:Alright. See you. Take care.
Speaker 1:Thanks. Bye. Bye.
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